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What constitutes an accident?-The most controversial question in
Workmen's Compensation Law has ever been "What constitutes an
accident?" The Supreme Court of Florida, in 1942, decided this question
in Duff Hotel v. Ficara,1 when it held that an unexpected injury received
in the ordinary performance of a duty in the usual manner is an injury
by accident, without showing anything fortuitous. Eight years later, the
court, in Brooks-Scanlon Inc. v. Lee,2 held that there must be an accident
preceding the injury and that the injury itself cannot constitute the
accident. In Peterson v. City Commission3 it was held that an injury to
a knee from the strain of squatting was not an injury by accident. These
conflicting decisions caused great confusion in the administration of the
compensation law and brought about extensive litigation.
La Viness v. Mauet4 stated, "Obviously there was no accident preceding
the heart attack and we have unequivocally held that the injury itself
will not suffice to constitute the accident." A back injury sustained in
lifting a ladder did not constitute an accident either. 5
In 1952, in a decision now generally referred to as the Bonnie Gray
case,6 the court held that an arm injury resulting from lifting a can of
waffle batter was compensable and that the unexpected result of lifting
the can was an injury by accident. Justice Roberts wrote in the opinion:
The statement that 'the injury itself cannot suffice for, or
constitute, the accident,' appearing in the Brooks-Scanlon case,...
and a few other opinions of this court, was perhaps an unfortunate
use of language. It was not intended that such statement should
be construed as requiring a showing of an unexpected cause of the
injury, such as a slip, fall or misstep; it was intended only to require
the claimant to make a showing of some event or circumstances
connected with his work to which his injury can be directly
attributed, in accordance with the rule that the claimant is required
to show that the accident or injury happened not only in the
course of claimant's employment but arose out of it. Travelers
Ins. Co. vs. Taylor, 147 Fla. 210, 3 So.2d 381.
tFor a complete analysis up to 1950, see Burton, Florida Workmen's Comensation
1935 to 1950, 5 MIAmi L.Q. 24.
*Member of the Florida Bar.
1. 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942).
2. 44 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1950).
3. 44 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1950).
4. 53 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1951).
5. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951).
6. Bonnie Cray v, Emvloyer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 64 So.2d 650
(Fla. 1952), 7 MUAmi L.Q. 280.
7. Id. at 651.
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We wish to make clear, however, that we do not interpret the
Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A. Sec. 440.01 et seq., as
requiring that an injury 'by accident' proceed from an unexpected
cause. Section 440.02(19) of the law defines 'accident' as 'an
unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly.' The Thorndike-
Barnhart Dictionary defines 'event' as '1. a happening, 2. result;
outcome.' To like'effect are the definitions given in The Oxford
English Dictionary and Bouv. Law Dict., Rawle's 'Third Revision,
p. 101. It is enough, then, if there is an unexpected result, even
though there was no unexpected cause, such as a slip, fall or
misstep, in order to constitute an 'accident' within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Law; and insofar as the McNeil
and Peterson cases, . . . hold that an injury is not compensable
if it happens while the claimant is performing his ordinary work
in the usual manner, these decisions arc hereby modified, and we
re-affirm the rule laid down in Duff Hotel Co. vs. Ficara . ..
that an unexpected injury received in the ordinary performance
of a duty in the usual manner is an injury 'by accident' within
the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Law, without the
showing of anything fortuitous.8
A rehearing was granted in the Bonnie Gray case. Upon rehearing
in April, 1953, the Supreme Court en banc adhered to its former opinionY
At the same time the court reaffirmed its decision by holding that back
injuries resulting from strain in doing work in the usual manner were
compensable as injuries "by accident." 10
The ruling in the Bonnie Cray case on rehearing was a four to three
decision, but the legislature, shortly thereafter, amended the compensation
act so as to make the definition therein of an accident to expressly conform
to the construction placed thereon by the Supreme Court. The statute
was amended to read:
'Accident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or
result, happening suddenly. A mental or nervous injury due to
fright or excitement only or disability or death due to the accidental
acceleration or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease
due to the habitual use of alcohol or narcotic drgs, shall be
deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the
employment. Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or
aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or
aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident
shall be compensable.11
Substantial evidence rule.-The Supreme Court adopted the
substantial evidence rule to be followed by the full commission in reviewing
8. Ibid..
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Benjamin Falk v. Clyde R. Balch, 64 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1953); Chas. B.
Vitale v. Wm. Haeser, 64 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1953).
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (19) (1953).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
the compensation orders of the deputy commissioners, and to be followed
by the circuit courts in reviewing the compensation orders of the full
commission, and to be followed by the Supreme Court in reviewing the
compensation orders of the circuit courts.12 The findings of fact made
by a deputy commissioner should not be reversed unless it is made to
appear that these findings of fact are not sustained by competent, substantial
evidence. Justice Hobson's opinion stated:
Thus it may be seen that under the law now existing and which
existed at the time the instant matter was first lodged with the
Florida Industrial Commission, the deputy commissioner is charged
with the duty of not only holding a hearing and making findings
of facts, but it is also his obligation to enter the compensation
order. Consequently, his position under the law is somewhat
analogous to that of a Chancellor, and the full Commission occupies
a position which in many ways is similar to that of an appellatt.
court. After the deputy commissioner has held a hearing, made
his findings of facts and entered the compensation order and a
review is requested, the full Commission should adhere to the
findings of fact so made by the deputy commissioner unless there
is no competent substantial evidence to sustain them. This is
so because of the aforementioned fact that under the law the deputy
commissioner is the only person charged with the burden and
the responsibility of hearing the witnesses and making findings
of facts. It is patent that the full Commission functions much
in the same manner as does an appellate court, although it is
quasi judicial rather than strictly so.13
Ever since this leading decision the Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to the substantial evidence rule.' 4
Modification of awards.-The Workmen's Compensation Law of
Florida contains a provision 15 vesting the Florida Industrial Commission
with continuing jurisdiction to review a "compensation case" within two
years after the last payment of compensation whether or not a compensation
order has been issued, and to issue a new compensation order, on the
ground of change of conditions or because of a mistake in a determination
of fact. In one case,16 a compensation order of a deputy commissioner
denying further compensation was affirmed by the full commission, but
no appeal was taken therefrom. Within the statutory period a petition
to review the case was filed by the injured employee on the ground that
12. U. S. Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
13. Id. at 745.
14. See Roberts v. Wofford Beach Hotel, 67 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1953); Smith v.
Packer Displays, Inc., 67 So.2d 323 (Ila. 1953); Faulk and Coleman v. Harper, 62 So.2d
62 (Fla. 1952); Sargent v. Evening Independent, 62 So.2d 58 (Fia. 1952); Carnage
v. City of Arcadia, 62 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952); American Airmotive Corp. v. Moore,
62 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1952); State Road Dept. v. Peper, 62 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952); Anderson
v. Anderson, 60 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1952); Evans v. Miami, 60 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1952);
Williamson v. Willard, 59 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Crescent City v. Green, 59 So.2d 1(Fla. 1951).
15. FLA. STAT. § 440.28 (1951).
16. McDonough v. Versailles Hotel, 57 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952).
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there was a nistake in the determination of the nature and extent of
claimant's physical injury. A hearing was held and the deputy commissioner
found that a mistake in the determination of a fact had been made and
that the petitioner was entitled to further compensation. On appeal
the full commission reversed the order of the deputy commissioner and
dismissed the cause. The order of the full commission on appeal was
affirmed by the circuit court. The order of the circuit court on appeal
was affirmed by the Supreme Court which held that the deputy commissioner
was without authority to review the order of the deputy commissioner
and the full commission, but was limited to finding a mistake in the
determination of fact.
The Supreme Court further found that a mistake in the determination
of a fact cannot be established by accumulative evidence that adds nothing
new to the evidence originally taken. This decision appears to be a
limitation of the jurisdiction of the commission imposed by the Florida
Supreme Court.
Evidence introduced at a hearing on a petition for modification of a
compensation order on the ground of a mistake in determination of a
fact, necessarily has to be accumulative or controvert that already taken
and upon which was based the finding of fact sought to be corrected
or set aside on the review of the case as a whole.
NOTEWORTHY OPINIONS
The order of the deputy commissioner requiring the furnishing of
further medical treatment was upheld in a case where claimant's resultant
thrombophlebitis could not be cured and the carrier had expended over
$4,000 for medical treatment.' 7
When a person knows that he is allergic to certain substances and
knowingly accepts employment requiring exposure to such substances,
dermatitis resulting from such exposure is not compensable as an accidental
injury or occupational disease because it is a condition voluntarily incurred
by the claimant.15
An employee, in descending the stairs at his home to have breakfast,
slipped and fell, sustaining a fractured shoulder. The injury was held
not to be compensable even though the employee had worked on the
books of the company that morning and was carrying the daily record
book of the company and other papers of the company in a folder at the
time he fell and was so injured.10 In holding that there was no causal
connection between the employment and the injury, the supreme court
reasoned, "The appellant was not on the stairs because of his employment;
17. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Pittman, 49 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1951).
18. Reed v. Brinson Electric Co., 50 So.2d 877 (fla. 1951).
19. Glasser v. Youth Shop, 54 So.2d 686 (Fla, 1951).
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he would have been there in any event, regardless of whether he had
brought his work home from the store."
An employee on a special mission was injured by reason of his
driving an automobile 75 to 80 miles per hour, in violation of the statute20
pertaining to excessive speed and reckless driving on the public highway.
He was denied compensation by reason of the provision of the compensation
act: "No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily
by (the employee's) willful refusal to observe a safety rule approved by
the commission or required by statute, and brought prior to the accident
to the knowledge of the employee. ' 21 However, the death of an employee
was held compensable when occasioned by the employee driving his car
80 miles per hour because of fright, said action not constituting willful
refusal to observe a safety rule required by statute.22
A permanent partial disability rating of 50 per cent of the body as a
whole was based on the medical testimony that the injured employee was
50 per cent disabled from any, or all types of work. The Supreme Court
in upholding the award of the deputy commissioner stated, "Our
consideration then narrows to one law, Section 440.02 F.S.A.: 'Disability
means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other
employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time
of the injury.' ,,20
Where an employee received a jolt in a traffic accident suffering
therefrom an emotional shock, but no physical injury, the court held that
the claimant was affected with nothing more than a mental or nervous
injury due to fright or excitement which is not an injury by accident under
the express provision of the compensation act, "a mental or nervous injury
due to fright or excitement only . . . shall be deemed not to be
an injury by accident arising out of the employment." 24
Refusal to undergo a serious or major operation by an injured employee,
who is genuinely afraid of the operation, will not defeat his right to
compensation. 25
An injured employee under the compensation act has complete control
of litigation against a third party for damges on account of the injury.
The compensation insurance carrier cannot intervene or be made a party
to the litigation without the consent of the employee.20
A nine year old boy was employed in violation of the child labor law.
The employer was held liable for damages. The Supreme Court held that
20. FrA. STAT. § 320.50 (1951).
21. Gregory v. McKesson & Robbins, 54 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1951).
22. American Airmotive Corp. v. Moore, 62 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1952).
23. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Tucker, 55 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1951).
24. City lee & Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
25. Sultan & Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952).
26. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Bedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952).
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the employer cannot hide behind the protective provision of the workmen's
compensation act. 27
A caddy was engaged by a player on a municipal golf course from a
caddy pen maintained by the municipality. TIe court held he was not
a city employee, but the employee of the player who hired, controlled and
paid him.28
Compensation at a minimum rate of $8.00 per week was awarded
to a part time employee. This decision20 of Division A appears contra
to the holding of the Supreme Court en banc,0 reversing the deputy
commissioner's award to another part time employee of compensation at
the rate of $8 per week and changing the rate to $18.60 based on the full
time weekly basis of $36.00.
The Statute of Limitations runs against all persons whether under
disabilities or not, because there is no saving clause in the statute with
reference to the time of filing appeals or petition for review or for
modification of a compensation order. 1 Appeals in compensation cases
must be perfected strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Law82 and not in accordance with the so-called
Uniform Appeals Act. 3 An appeal from the circuit to the Supreme Court
was dismissed on the ground that the notice of appeal was not filed within
the time prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Law.84 Petition for
a writ of certiorari, also filed by appellants, was denied because review by
the Supreme Court of a circuit court order can only be by statutory
appeal. Failure of the appellant to name any return day in the notice of
appeal from the commission to the circuit court was held fatal.3 5
LEGISLATIvE ENACTMENrS
Several amendments to the Florida Compensation Law were enacted
in the 1953 session of the legislature. The time for filing medical reports
was shortened. In order to hold the employer liable for medical treatment
of an injured employee, it is now necessary that the doctor file his medical
report with the commission and the employer within 20 days following
the first treatment of the injury.36
Added to the provisions for the determination of pay are those for
part time workers:
If it be established that the injured employee was a part-time
worker at the time of the injury, that he had adopted part-time
27. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1952).
28. Miami v. Fulp, 60 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1952).
29. Jackson v. Chas. F. Conner, 62 So.2d 26 (17a. 1952).
30. Perrin v. Tanner, 46 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1950).
31. Faulk and Coleman v. Harper, 62 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1952).
32. Smith v. Fletcher Motor Sales, 62 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1952).
33. Fla. Laws 1945, c. 22854.
34. Boca Raton Club v. Duff, 63 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1953).
35. Lipkin v. Roxy Cleaners & Laundry, 67 So.2d 660 (Fla. 1953).
36. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28241.
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employment as his customary practice, and that under normal
conditions he probably would have remained a part-time worker
during the period of disability, these factors may be considered
in arriving at his average weekly wages. For the purpose of this
subsection the term 'Part-time Worker' means an individual who
customarily works less than the full-time hours or full-time work
week of a similar employee in the same employment because unable
or unwilling to accept full-time work, and does not include any
employee who was working on a part-time basis because (a) his
employer failed to provide full-time work for him, (b) he was
unable to obtain full-time work, or (c) his attendance at school
or college did not permit full-time employment. "T
Employees at a state tuberculosis sanitarium or hospital having
tuberculosis prior to employment by the state tuberculosis board, will not
be entitled to compensation on account of their pre-existing tuberculosis
being aggravated by the employment.88
In death compensation cases, the limit for funeral expenses was
increased from $150 to $350.89
The circuit courts of this state were given jurisdiction to enforce
compensation orders which have been filed, upon the application by the
commission or any beneficiary of such order. The procedure so authorized
provides for the issuance of a rule nisi to the employer or carrier to show
cause why a writ of execution should not be issued and for the issuance
of a writ of execution or such other provision or final order as may be
necessary to enforce the terms of the defaulted compensation order, if
the proper cause be not shown that execution should not issue.' 0
The period for filing a petition for modification of compensation
order was extended from one year to two years. 4"
The penalty for double liability in compensation cases where minors
are injured in employment in violation of the child labor laws of Florida,
was modified so as to leave the amount of penalty to be imposed in each
case to the discretion of the commission, but not to exceed double the
amount otherwise payable.4 2
Employees of the state, political subdivisions and public or quasi
public corporations, will draw full compensation, and no deduction in the
amount thereof will be made by reason of any sums received from any
pension or other benefit fund.43  Such deductions were required before
the act was so amended.
To the attorneys, the most important changes in the compensation
act were the amendments in reference to the review of compensation
37, FLA. STAT. § 440.14(5 1953).38. FLA. STAT. § Ji1 If) (1953).
39. FLA. STAT. § 440,16(1 (1953
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.24(1 1953
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.28 ( 953).
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.54 (1953).
43. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (4) (1953).
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orders. The old law authorized review of the order of the deputy
commissioner by the full commission, on application for review by one
of the parties; and the review of the order of the full commission by
the circuit court of the county where the accident occurred, upon a
statutory appeal; and review of the order of the circuit court by the
Supreme Court upon another statutory appeal. By Chapter 28241, Laws of
Florida, 1953, the two statutory appeals were abolished and review of the
orders of the full commission by the Supreme Court on petition for a
writ of certiorari was authorized in lieu thereof.44  In the opinion filed
January 8, 1954, in the case of Elizabeth Wilson v. McCoy Manufacturing
Company, Inc., and Florida Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court
ruled that the legislature did not have the power to provide for a review
of the orders of the Florida Industrial Commission by writ of certiorari
because the power to issue these writs is placed in the Supreme Court by
the Constitution itself and the Supreme Court alone had the power to
prscribe the procedure it shall follow in the exercise of its constitutional
powers.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court adopted certain rules in amplification
of Rule 28, governing common law certiorari, by adding three paragraphs
dealing generally with certiorari in industrial cases and particularly with
transcript in such cases. Said rules are set forth and explained in the
opinion in the said case.
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.27 as amended (1953).
